@jagreehal/workflow@1.16.0
Typed async workflows with automatic error inference. Build type-safe workflows with Result types, step caching, resume state, and human-in-the-loop support.
A narrow-focus index of malicious packages caught exfiltrating credentials — across npm, PyPI, GitHub Actions, the VS Code Marketplace, and Hugging Face. AWS keys, npm/PyPI tokens, browser cookies, wallet seeds, AI API keys, CI secrets. Each entry quotes the actual exfiltration code.
We don't track package pollution, generic typosquats without a payload, or wallet drainers without credential theft. Just packages that actually try to steal something. See methodology for the inclusion criteria.
Filtered to OSV-validated, known-actor, maintainer-takeover, or 100k+/wk blast catches from the recent window. If this list is empty the firehose is quiet.
Typed async workflows with automatic error inference. Build type-safe workflows with Result types, step caching, resume state, and human-in-the-loop support.
Types for Microsoft Graph objects
Microsoft Application Insights Common JavaScript Library
JavaScript library of crypto standards.
JavaScript cryptography library providing hashing, HMAC, PBKDF2, AES encryption, and encoding utilities
Zero Knowledge Provable JSON
Latest packages classified as malicious or pending review by the analyzer pipeline. Every entry links to the package, its tarball, and the offending code.
Autonomous CVE remediation system with AI patching, runtime validation, KinD testing, and zero-trust deployment gates.
→ Static analyzer matched curl-pipe-bash: unambiguous remote-code-execution shape in the install path.
Lattice AI v3 local-first AI workspace platform with knowledge graph, vector index, hybrid search, agents, and workspace modes.
→ Static analyzer matched curl-pipe-bash: unambiguous remote-code-execution shape in the install path.
a domain ssl cert admin
→ Encoded payload + dynamic execution combo (event-stream / flatmap-stream shape) — embedded blob decoded and executed at install time. Fast-tracked.
Which kinds of credentials caught packages were after, by category. Cloud platform keys, source-control tokens, browser logins, password manager stores, crypto wallets, AI API keys.
Source-linked analyses of notable credential incidents. Each article names its evidence and records substantive corrections.
Source-linked analysis of the May 2026 AntV npm account compromise, affected versions, execution paths, and credential exposure response.
npm worm hit 373 versions across 169 packages (@tanstack, @squawk, @uipath, mistralai) via trusted-publishing OIDC abuse and a prepare-script git dep that exfiltrates cloud and registry secrets at install.
npm publisher microsop pushed 36 versions across 6 Apple-themed packages between May 4–11, 2026, fingerprinting Apple internal CI and exfiltrating npmrc, env vars, and git origin to 12 rotating webhook.site endpoints.
A malicious build of @bitwarden/cli was published to the public npm registry for roughly 90 minutes, exfiltrating cloud tokens, SSH keys, and AI tooling credentials from CI runners and developer machines.
A third-party AI tool used by a Vercel employee was compromised, leading to Google Workspace takeover and access to non-sensitive environment variables in a subset of customer projects.
Compromised maintainer publish credentials were used to push two malicious versions of the official @solana/web3.js npm package, embedding a routine that exfiltrated private keys from any wallet using the SDK.